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Abstract 
This paper outlines the results of some research into three former 
county council services - primary education, minor roads and rural health 
services - taken over by the central government in 1970. It describes the 
organization of these services under the county councils and examines the 
financial relationships between the councils,-and the centre, drawing atten-
tion to the way in which the system worked to encourage "crisis financing" 
on the part of the councils. It then considers the impact of the transfer 
of functions on each of the three services, and relates this to the general 
pattern of service provision in rural Kenva, and the interaction between 
local initiatives ("self-help") and government action. 
{ 
The aim of this paper* is to present some of the findings of the 
research I have been doing into the operation of certain .local-level 
services in Kenya - primary schools, minor roads and rural health services. 
The main reason for concentrating on these services is that they were 
initially run by local authorities - in the rural areas, county councils, 
usually operating at the district level - but in 1970 were transferred to 
the ministries of the central government. This transfer raises a number of 
questions for study, some of which I examined in an earlier paper (1972), 
where I suggested that the transfer should be seen not so much as a complete 
switch from one organization to another, but rather as a shift in power 
relationships within a single service structure. The question I posed then 
was "How do changes in the formal relationships between service personnel, 
intermediaries and clients affect the operation of the service?" This par>er 
attempts to answer that question.. 
I would like first to clarify some of the features "of service 
operation under the county councils. 
From 1963 to 1969, County Councils were responsible for providing these 
three services in the rural areas, their main sources of revenue being school 
fees, Graduated Personal Tax and grants from the central government. (Some 
councils derive & considerable revenue from produce cesses - mainly coffee.) 
The formal control structure was the relevant committee of the county council, 
which gave instructions to the chief executive for the service - the 
District Education Officer, the Medical Officer of Health and the Works Officer 
In the first two cases, these were central government officers posted to 
the council, who acted as the link between the.central government (which 
operated services down to the level of the secondary school and the district 
hospital) and the county councils (which operated the services below this 
level). Role conflict was inevitable: were they the servants of the county 
council, or central government agents keeping council action in conformity 
with central governemnt policy? The conflict was never officially resolved. 
Since these officers were not formally seconded to their councils, were paid 
by their ministries and were subject to transfer to other posts at the whim 
of their own ministries, they themselves usually had little doubt: they 
* Partly because of idleness, partly because most of this papar was 
written out of library range, I have not cited any sources, but simply 
presented an argument. I would like to acknowledge particularly helpful 
comments on an earlier draft from David Leonard and Ben Kipkorir, and an 
interesting paper by Silas Ita on the role of the chiefs in ?bere. 
(Stencil, Department of Government, University of Nairobi. 1972). 
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were the central government men on the spot. Some felt the pressures more 
than others: education officers, receiving a flow of specific directions from 
their ministry in Nairobi and a flow of equally specific demands from their 
council education committee, often felt that they were being ground 
between the two. Medical Officers of Health tended to feel this pressure 
less than their counterparts in education: their service was more 
technical, but it was also less important politically, and their high 
/ . 
transfer rate tended to reduce their involvement with the council. In both 
cases, the county council tended to make its influence felt more in 
service expansion than in day-to-dav operation - where the next dispensary 
should go rather than what the existing ones should be doing. In formal 
terms, the DEO's power to control education in his district was increased 
by t*he 1968 Education Act, but the real effect of this is not clear: if, 
for instance, the act merely formalized the existing situation, or was 
even a defensive move to maintain the DEO's powers intact in the face of 
increasing pressure from clients. 
In the field of roads, "there were fewer links between the ministry 
and the local authorities. The ministry maintained roads with an "A" or "B" 
classification (occasionally, sections of these roads were maintained by 
local authorities under contract), and the county councils were responsible 
for the maintenance of "C" classified roads, for which they received grants 
from J'bW. In addition, county councils were empowered to maintain (from 
their own resources) all unclassified roads in their areas. Some of these 
might be formally gazetted as minor roads, but-most would not. Hence there 
would be two overlapping road maintenance teams in a district: a ministry 
roads team, with its own plant and camps, maintaining the major roads, and 
a countv council roads organization maintaining the "C" roads and the 
unclassified roads. There were some links between the two. Where councils 
were contractors for the ministry (e.g. for the maintenance of major roads, 
or for the construction of tea roads), the ministry would supervise 
performance. The ministry was also responsible for ensuring that councils 
carried out their obligation to maintain the grant-aided "C" roads. But 
generally there was a minimum of contact between the two. The ministry 
did not attempt to prescribe standards for staff or for service performance, 
the council selected and employed its own Works Officer, and the two • 
organizations led independent lives (of infinite variety). 
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Since financial questions attracted the most public attention while 
the counties were responsible for these services, and were the public 
justification for the central decision to take control of them, it is worth 
going into the financial arrangements in some detail. Before independence, 
the Fiscal Commission had outlined an arrangement for matching local 
authority revenues and responsibilities, but this scheme was substantially 
altered by the abolition of the regions in 19<$H, which left the central 
government responsible for grants to local authorities. It is open to 
question whether the Fiscal Commission scheme would have worked in any 
case: it appeared to assume that all the potential G.P.T. would be collected, 
whereas pre-independence 50h had been a respectable collection figure and 
after independence the proportion tended to decline. This under-collection 
was not substantially affected by the transfer (in 1965) of responsibility 
for G.P.T. collection from the councils to the Provincial Administration, 
and it has been suggested that chiefs have an interest in under-assessing 
their constituents, since it enables them to.raise a man's assessment as a 
disciplinary measure. 
In any case, the councils tended to be faced with a static tax base 
which they were powerless to change (they controlled neither the rate of 
tax nor its collection) and rising service costs (mainly in education as 
a result of rising enrolments and rising teachers' salaries). (Produce 
cesses gave some councils more financial stability, but these could not be 
relied on: they were very unpopular, and the government was always under 
pressure to abolish them, which it did in the case of the maize cess.) 
This led to an increasing dependence on central government grants, adminis-
tered by the Ministry of Local Government. In theory each council would 
submit its estimates to the ministry at the specified time each year, the 
ministry would approve them, and the grant would be paid according to a known 
formula. In practice, councils submitted their estimates late or in a form 
unacceptable to the ministry, estimates tended to get swallowed up in the' 
ministry and never emerge again, either approved or disapproved (in which 
case the council concerned had to work from the last approved estimates), 
and usually the council would get only a part of its grant at the time it 
was meant to. The consequences of this situation will be discussed further, 
but first some mention should be made of another public issue in the field 
of finance, the "diversion of funds" argument. 
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This argument, which is really a sub-argument of the "gross 
financial irresponsibility" argument, contends that the counties diverted 
funds given to them for other purposes (notably roads) and spent them on 
salaries (especially teachers' salaries). This is said to be the reason 
for the decline in the quality of the rural roads system 1963-9. (I have 
also heard the reverse argument: that the poor quality of the primary 
schools is due to the fact that the county council was diverting money 
intended for education and spending it on roads.) Grants to county councils 
came in three forms: the block grant from the Ministry of Local Government, 
to cover all aspects of council operations; the roads grant from the 
Ministry of Works for the maintenance of the C classified roads; and various 
small special-purpose grants from other ministries and parastatal bodies 
like marketing boards. It was only the latter two types that were capable 
of being "diverted", since the block grant from Local Government.was non-
specific. It is difficult to find evidence of the diversion of the 
Ministry of Works grant (i.e. councils spending less of road maintenance 
than they had been given), though Ministry of Works staff are convinced 
that it was an almost universal practice. -One of the difficulties involved 
here is that the counties did not in fact know how much it was costing them 
to maintain any particular road, and hence it is difficult to knew whether 
the grant for that road was being "diverted". It appears that county roads 
organizations made little distinction between classified and unclassified 
roads, so it is most probable that some of the MoW grant was being spent 
on unclassified roads, but'difficult to prove. But the MDW'S system of 
inspection (and the willingness of the ministry to hold up grants if 
maintenance was not being done) limited the ability of councils to divert 
funds from this source. It was probably easier to divert special pumose 
•grants (e.g. for cotton roads from the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board 
where the machinery of inspection was weaker. The evidence usually adduced -
decline in road standards - is not very helpful, because usually the roads 
concerned are unclassified roads which did not attract a grant in any case. 
In fact, the argument is usually not about diversion of special-purpose 
funds, but about the way that the councils chose to spend their general 
revenues (including the block grant from the Ministry of Local Government). 
I.e. given more calls on their funds than they could meet, councils tended 
to snend money on e.g. primary schools, at the expense of unclassified roads, 
veterinary scouts, etc. Those inconvenienced by the choice of priorities 
(e.g. the Provincial Administration, which suffered from the deterioration 
of the former Administrative Roads, now unclassified) might claim that the 
councils were "diverting" money from its "proper'1 use. 
To return to the general question of county council finances - ' 
Three main factors seem to have been involved: 
(a) the nature of the financial dealings with the Ministry of Local I 
Government, which resulted in monies due not being paid, and immediate 
attention being given only.to those councils on the verge of.bankruptcy; 
(b) the relatively low calibre of county council staff resulted in 
poor financial management; this point is not as important as central 
government spokesmen like to make out, though; much more important is -
(c) the strenth and number of the political pressures on the council 
to provide services, which led to all possible resources (including reserves, 
Area Council funds, etc) being tapped. Factors (a) and (c) tended to be 
mutually reinforcing. If a council could not get the grant it had been 
expecting from Nairobi, it would have to draw on any other .funds that it 
could mobilize - cash reserves, depreciation funds, etc. Conversely, if a 
council was known in Nairobi to have good financial reserves, it could not 
expect early attntion from the Ministry to its claims. Consequently, it 
would have every reason for keeping its reserves low. 
The end result was a process which might be described as "crisis 
financing". A Council can only perform the duties expected of it with the 
aid of a substantial grant from the centre; it will not get this grant unless 
it appears that the council will expire without it; consequently the only 
way a council could be financially successful was to appear to be on the 
verge of bankruptcy, (Of course, some councils were on the verge of 
bankruptcy, but fewer than met the eye.) A typical council might find itself 
in financial straits having only received 20% of its grant and having no 
reserves and no creditworthiness. It would then retrench 100 untrained tea 
teachers. The Kenya National Union of Teachers would threaten a strike, 
and take the matter up with the Ministry of Education. After inter 
ministerial negotiations in Nairobi, more funds would be released from the 
Ministry of Local Government (often in the form of a loan rather than as 
a part of the grant, but the distinction was of little practical consequence), 
and the council would continue operations for another six or twelve months, 
when there might be another "crisis". To bureaucrats in Nairobi, this might 
be evidence of "financial incompetence", but in fact it was the most 
effective way for a council to work the system. There may have been 
financial mismanagement in the councils, but the closure of schools or the 
dismissal of teachers is unlikely to be evidence of it. It is not only 
Kenyan county councils that find themselves in this situation: any local 
authority with financial claims on the next tier of government can gain from 
crisis financing, and the most spectacular example of it is probably New York 
City in its relations with New York State and with the Federal Government. 
This was the situation that prevailed when the central government 
decided, in October 1969, to take over from the county councils their 
education, health and roads tasks, together with the -proceeds of G.P.T. The 
immediate spur for this move was another council financial crisis (non-
payment of teachers' salaries), but there were a number of underlying motives. 
Many bureaucrats, especially in the Provincial Administration, found the 
local authority style of administration distasteful: it was inefficient, 
sometimes corrupt, and above all, messy. There was political opposition at 
the centre to county councils as political arenas and sources of resources 
not under the direct control of the central political-bureaucratic elite. 
The centre found the crisis-financing of the county councils and embarassment 
and. decided to remove the causes of the embarassment, although it did not 
abolish the county councils completely, but left them intact with minimal 
functions. The decision was taken a very short notice, the ministries 
concerned were not prepared for it, and the actual transfer took much longer 
than expected. 
The implications of the transfer for the actual running of the 
services varied from one service to another. In education, there was ^more 
continuity than change. The primary school teachers had already been 
placed on the payroll of the Teachers Service Commission (under a complicated 
arrangement whereby the county councils were meant to pay the TSC the monthly 
teachers'' salaries for their areas), the DEO continued in office and the 
subordinate staff were transferred to the Ministry of Education. In terms 
of the formal structure, the DEO gained a good deal of political space: he 
no longer had to negotiate with the Education Committee of his county council, 
and although it was announced in 1969 that District Education Boards would 
be re-instituted, it was three years before they met, and they still have 
not really established a role for themselves, although DEO's do not expect 
them to cramp their style in any significant way. But one must also 
consider the local arena: many of the resources for primary education are 
locally-derived, and the' relationship between a headmaster, his school 
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committee and the local community is of considerable importance. The DEO's 
power over any particular school is limited to the extent that he can grant 
or withold resources that the school wants, and in most cases, the main 
resource he controls is the supply of teachers. In fact, ministry policy 
is to supply teachers to any school where the parents -out up the 
necessary classrooms: minimum class sizes are mentioned from time to time 
within the linistry hut they have never been imposed on DEOs. Some DEO's, 
though, are able to impose particular conditions on parents - e.g. stone 
classrooms rather than earth-walled. As long as the DEO is able to fill 
up any gaps in his teaching force with untrained Form IV leavers, he is 
able to meet all the demands that local communities make. Consequently, 
most of the important decisions about any particular school - notably about 
exapansion - are decided at the local level, between the headmaster and 
representatives of the local community. If they agree to build a new class-
room so that Standard I can be double-streamed, it is unlikely that the 
DEO will intervene to stop them. Since the transfer of functions, the 
importance of the headmaster-school committee relationship has probably . 
increased: certainly it is no longer subject to check by the councillor, who 
formerly provided an independent line of communication with the DEO. 
To a certain extent, education is a service which has been captured 
by its client group. It is a particularly critical service from the point 
of view of the people, because no many of the economic opportunities in 
Kenya are determined by level of education. For this reason, the political 
costs of refusing entry to the bottom of the educational ladder are enormous, 
(except in the pastoral districts) and primary education expansion is not 
subject to any real constraints from the centre. The annual rate of 
increase in the costs of primary education is probal?/ considerably more now 
than it was under the county Councils,- mainly because of increased 
expenditure on teachers' salaries. The ministry and its field officers are 
able to define technical norms to a certain extent, and control admission 
to the next stage of education, but the basic pattern of provision is set 
by the clients. 
As with education, the transfer of functions had little impact on the 
operation of the rural health services. The Medical Officer of Health 
(MOH) remained as the head of the service, most of the county council staff 
were absorbed into the ministry in situ, and the service operates much as 
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it did before, with the K)H freed of the minor irritant of the county 
council health ,committee. Some county council staff were offered subs-
tantial salary cuts and chose to resign; there were relatively few people in 
this position but they tended to be the most senior and expeerienced men in 
their grades. Critics of the county councils took this as evidence that the 
councils were paying high salaries to men unqualified for their jobs, for 
reasons of nepotism and corruption. Council.supporters took it as evidence 
that the ministry was blinded by paper qualifications and unwilling to 
recognize the value of experience. One problem that will be faced in the 
future is the replacement of ex-county council staff as they .reach retiring 
age, as ministry policy is not to recruit any more unqualified staff and 
even with a vast increase in the output of qualified staff (which is being 
planned) there is. likely to be a shortfall. There have also been some 
problems with the supply of drugs, where it does arroear that most councils 
were more flexible than the ministry's central stores in Nairobi. 
But as far as the expansion of the health services is concerned, 
as opposed to the operation of existing centres, the K)H is rather less in 
control. The Ministry does in-theory have a plan for the construction of 
new health centres, but the provision made is so meagre (5 health centres 
per year for the whole country) that each district has only slightly better 
than a 50% chance of acquiring a new centre in the course of the entire plan 
period (1970-7*0. An K3H who can only offer this sort of expansion would be 
unlikely to secure the support of the district elite for it. Moreover, MDHs 
have few resources of their own: there are limited funds in the ministry 
budget for the building of health centres, and they are held at the provincial 
level, so. that any expansion can only come from self-help health centres 
being taken over by the government. The consequences of dependence on 
self-help for service expansion are well-known: priorities are defined by the 
local communities in terms of their ability to raise the funds needed to 
erect the centres and to mobilize the political push needed to have them 
taken over by the government, and .the areas which do well at this tend to be 
the ones already well-endowed, with health facilities. In theory projects are 
meant to be vetted by the M)H, but for a number of reasons, • this does not 
constitute a powerful constraint. For one thing, a self-help health centre 
takes several years - one A/MDH estimated five years - to complete,, and 
lOHs are prone to let the project begin, and worry about incorporating it 
into the service structure when it is .closer to completion. (The FDH will 
undoubtedly have been transferred elsewhere by then in any case.) And the 
self-help health centres which cause the most problems - the ones now 
- 9 -
approaching completion - were approved (or not) years ago, so the device of 
approval will not solve the problem. Even a complete ban on self-help health 
centre projects would not have any effect for some years - but while the 
benefits might not be felt for some years, the political costs would be 
felt immediately. The pressure is therefore on the J1 OH to approve the ' 
project, and it is • .usual for'him to approve. In a way, a completed but 
unopened harambee health centre can become a form of resource for the 
TOH, as it tends to back UP his case for more staff, even though he is not 
yet responsible for staffing these units. (He can also tell the backers 
of these centres that the can only open them if Nairobi give him more 
staff, in the hope that they will then put pressure on the ministry.) 
The MOH, then, is in a situation where he is unable to make any 
decisions about service expansion, and simply transfers the overload to 
Nairobi by leaving questions of opening and staffing new centres to the 
ministry. Consequently, the district level has been eclipsed in 
importance. (Such bodies as the District Development Committee are of 
relatively little importance: the real prizs is a ministry commitment to 
meet the running expenses of the centre.) The action tends to take place at 
the local level, where the local notables raise the money for putting up the 
building, and in Nairobi, where the pressure has to be exerted on the 
ministry to take it over. This is, obviously, in marked contrast to the 
council period, when expansion decisions were made by, the , „ .,„. council itself. IAt this time, local communities would put up buildings for 
health centres, and the Council and its Health Committee would decide which 
(if any) would be taken, over, in the light of the council's financial position 
and the pattern of demand from constituents.) 
One could have expected the impact of the transfer of functions to 
be greatest in the field of roads, where there was a massive expansion of • 
the maintenance responsibilities of the Ministry of Works, but very little 
contact between the ministry and the councils. The Ministry had in fact 
been gearing up for an expansion of its responsibilities in rural areas, and 
had appointed a firm of consultants to advise on th*3 reorganization of the 
ministry, but was taken by surprise by the timing of the transfer of 
functions, and took several years to incorporate the county council roads 
into the organizational structure of the ministry. 
There were distinct differences in organizational style between the 
ministry and the councils' road organizations. The ministry sees itself 
in professional terms, with norms being set.by the professional engineers in 
the Nairobi HQ. and in the nrnvinc-inl n-F-F-?n(=c mi*on+ ,-,-ui j 
V 
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mediated through these engineers and not put directly to the operatives in 
the districts. The county organizations did not have this professional 
superstructure, and saw themselves as functional organizations established 
to meet particular demands from their councils, and accepted that some of 
these demands would-be put direct to the grader-driver. In terms of staff 
and equipment, the ministry is much better-off than the councils.were, 
although this was not so until new equipment had been bought for the 
ministry from an IBRD loan, and there were great variations among the 
councils, some of which were possibly better-off before the transfer of 
functions than they are now. The sort of maintenance done, though, is 
basically-the same: neither organization was able to nlan much in advance 
or to cost maintenance and relate it to benefit gained, and both tended to 
respond to the most pressing needs. The main difference is in the 
definition of these needs: under the councils, these were largely defined 
by the pattern of local political pressures from such people as councillors 
and chiefs. With the present organization, the pressing needs tend to be 
defined by the district OIC or the Provincial Engineer, and to reach 
the engineer one has to be more prestigeous (e.g. an MP rather than a 
councillor) and one also tends to have rather less impact, since the 
provincial level official is dealing with so many more representations. 
Hence one effect of the transfer has been to drive up the level at which 
effective representation can be achieved. 
But the main difference between the two organizations has been the 
handling of unclassified roads. The counties had been entitled to maintain 
these, though they were not obliged to and received no grants for them. At 
the transfer of functions, the ministry specified that it was only 
responsible for the maintenance of the classified roads, and that the 
county councils were still responsible for those roads not taken over by the 
ministry. (The ministry even haggled over some of the classified roads, 
eventually giving them a temporary classification, which means that they will 
be maintained if funds are available but that the Ministry does not accept 
permanent responsibility for them.) The county councils' handling of these 
unclassified roads had varied. Jfost of them had received no or very little 
maintenance, but in some cases where a good deal of pressure could be 
brought to bear (e.g. a road to a coffee factory, or a trading centre, or a 
councillor's house) work could be done. Now the ministry says that these 
roads are the responsibility of the county councils, while the county 
councils say that the ministry has taken over all their equipment and they 
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are therefore powerless to act. The Ministry of Local Gov: rnment decreed 
that in each district there should oe a District Works Committee, with 
representatives from the county council presided over by the D.C., to 
determine lists of priorities and costings for the maintenance of unclassified 
roads. These committees met (usually only once or twice) and compiled long 
lists of unclassified roads, with costings for their maintenance running 
into six figures, and sent them to the Ministry of Local Government, where 
they rested. The original idea had been that the Treasury would be 
approached by Local Government for money for these roads, and Works would 
then do the maintenance on an agency basis. I am not sure whether the ' 
Treasury was asked for this money, but they did not release it if they 
were. 
At the moment, that is where matters rest. - Works are not anxious 
to investigate the unclassified roads, as the cost of maintenance with 
current methods would be prohibitive, and possible alternative methods 
(self-help, low-cost day labour, hourly rental of plant to self-help 
groups, etc.) are administratively messy. Ministry spokesmen tend to 
understate the importance of these roads - for instance, by referring 
to them as "tracks" or "footpaths" - but on their own estimate they 
constitute nearly three-quarters of the country's road network (125,000 of 
168,000 km.). The question is still under discussion in the ministries of 
Works and Finance & Planning. 
In general, the consequence of the transfer for roads has been a 
general improvement in standards of maintenance (along with a substantial 
rise in maintenance costs), but with the exclusion of the majority of 
rural roads from the possibility of maintenance. Self-help maintenance 
(usually organized by the chief) is sometimes carried out of these roads, 
but officially the m9nistry does not take notice of it - until it is asked 
to match the voluntary contribution of the people. The ministry, because 
of its highly centralized organization and its professional ethos, is 
relatively insulated from localized road maintenance demands, thus raising 
the level at which effective representation can be made. For planning and 
expansion, it^has made itself even more inaccessible, receiving suggestions 
for new classifications only from Provincial Development Committees and 
adopting a general policy that new roads will not be added to the Road 
Inventory except in extraordinary cases. 
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. So far we have been concerned only with details of the operation 
of the three services: we should now move to a consideration of the 
structure of service provision as a whole. The main elements of this 
pattern are (a) the increasing importance of local initiatives in service 
provision; and" • (b) the increasing tendency for 
local service issues to be resolved at the centre: and (c) the relative 
decline of the district as a decision-making level in service provision. 
Local initiatives have always been an important element in service 
provision in Kenya, (This is quite apart from local contributions 
instigated from outside, such as the local labour which built a road on 
the instructions of the DC, or a school at the urging of the missionary.) 
Local initiatives can provide an alternative to the official service: e.g. 
when mission schools in Kikuvu land were closed to those who would not for-
swear female circumcision, local communities set up their own independent 
schools. Or local initiatives may form a part of the official service, e.g. 
when the local community is expected to build the classroom required for a-
new class to be formed. In the same way, a local initiative may become a 
procedural, requirement for access-to an official service: a community 
wanting a new class must build the classroom before their application will 
be considered. In such cases the administrator of the service is able 
to limit the number of cases he must consider, but would find it much more 
difficult to control the number of applicants seeking to meet'his 
initial criteria - those engaged on the local projects. 
We can see here some of the main features of "self-help" in Kenya 
as a means of service provision. First,it is seen by its promoters as 
a means of access to the official service rather than as an alternative 
to .them. In some cases (e.g. self-help secondary schools), the service will 
begin operation with local resources in the hope that the government may 
be persuaded to take over responsibility for it. In others (e.g. self-help 
health centres), the local community only erects the buildings, and then 
puts pressure on the government to provide the staff and supplies to run 
it. Government agencies reinforce this tendency by gearing their 
expansion programmes (for want- of a better word) to the pattern of self-help 
activity rather than to .their a m assessment .of need. The ministry of 
Education, for instance, has declared that it will not build any new 
secondary schools of its own, but will only take over existing -self-help 
ones. Hence a self-help secondary school becomes an essential prerequisite 
to the siting of a government secondary school in an area. Secondlv, these 
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local initiatives do relieve some of the immediate pressure on government 
agencies, which was the main reason for the original government encourage-
ment of local initiatives. But the projects which manage to get through 
this stage are less easily ignored than are simple requests for more 
government activity, which is one of the reasons that government agencies 
tend to respond to self-help pressures rather than any other criteria of 
need. Thirdly, these initiatives provide an arena for local competitive 
politics: to promote a self-help projects he has promoted. One self-help 
secondary school, for instance, collapsed for want of pupils when the MP 
who promoted it was defeated at the election: to parents, it was clear 
that the hopes of a government take-over of the school depended on the 
political fortunes of its patron. For this reason, chiefs have become 
increasingly involved in self-help initiatives, either because they 
themselves are promoting the project concerned, or because their support 
(as the local representatives of the central government) is essential if 
the project is to have any hope of attracting government support. This 
trend appears to have the support of the chiefs' superiors in the 
Provincial Administration, and the public exhortations of DCs and PCs to 
chiefs to "promote development" in their locations seems to be inter-
preted by both parties to mean "start self-help projects". (The 
Provincial Administration has of course an interest in establishing the 
chief as the most effective representative of his area.) When a self-help 
project is promoted by a chief, it is likely to have many "administrative" 
aspects: fixed contributions are likely to be demanded from each family and 
to be collected by subchiefs and the Administration Police, and official 
sanctions imposed on non-contributors. 
At the same time as the importance of local initiatives has 
increased, there has been a greater tendency for local service issues to 
be resolved at the centre. There are various reasons for this. In the 
first place, there is a general tendency towards centralization of critical 
decisions within the government bureaucracy, especially decisions on 
service expansion. The transfer of functions from the county councils to 
the central government has accentuated this trend by bringing formally auto-
nomous service structures under the direct control of the ministries 
concerned. Consequently, many decisions which under the county councils would 
have been settled at the district level must now be referred to Nairobi for 
decision. Finally, the formal organizational boundaries of the various 
levels and agencies of government do not constitute an effective barrier 
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to appeals. The fact that a certain.decision.is the. formal responsibility 
of the departmental head at the district level will not prevent _an 
aggrieved party from pursuing his case in Nairobi, and may not .inhibit 
ministry officials from issuing a directive to the district head. 
With the increase in the importance of both the local and the 
national level, there has been a corresponding decline in the importance 
of the district level. The transfer of functions has (obviously) reduced 
the importance of the district level in the fields of primary education, 
health and roads, but there appear to.have been similar pressures in other 
fields. The pattern of political representation has followed the shift in 
effective responsibility within the bureaucracy, with representatives in 
the capital (e.g. MPs, or bureaucrats acting as representatives of their 
home areas) gaining ground at the expense of district-level figures such 
as county councillors. For instance, Ministry of Works- officials who 
welcomed their takover of the county councils' roads functions as leading 
to greater efficiency, later complained that their time was being 'wasted' 
by delegations and individual lobbyists seeking action on specific roads. 
One consequence of this shift is that effective planning is difficult to 
achieve. If, for instance, the decision to build a self-help health 
centre is taken at the local level, and the decision to open it as' a 
government service point is taken at the national level, the ability of the 
Medical Officer of Health to plan the expansion of health services is 
limited. While the decision-making process at the district level can be 
circumvented to appeal to the centre, it is difficult to see hew there can 
be effective planning at the district level: it is not yet clear what 
effect the new vogue for district-level planning will have on this process. 
After the transfer of functions there were moves to establish district-level 
consulative bodies for particular services, but they were rather hesitant 
ones. For instance, it was announced in 1969 that District Education Boards 
would be established to control primary education,, but three years elapsed 
before any DE.B met, and they do not appear to offer any serious check to 
the power of the District Education Officer and the Ministry.. . Spokesmen of 
the centre have urged that "politics" should have no place in these .bodies, 
and both the District Education Board and the District Works Committee (which 
draws up priorities for the takeover of unclassified roads), are chaired by 
the DC. 
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So the effect on the services of the transfer of functions has varied. 
The transfer has largely eliminated one type of client representation - the 
county councillor sitting on the council committee - hut has not detracted 
from (and may have enhanced) another type of representation: the self-help 
group./wtucfi it1!'type of decision-making as well as a means of political 
participation, leaves certain critical decision in the hands of clients 
rather than officials, and where a service is heavily dependent on self-help 
(e.g. primary education), the real freedom of action of the official is 
limited. Consequently the effect of the.transfer of functions has been 
limited. Conversely, in roads, where self-help is unimportant, it has 
heen possible for the ministry to substantially change the nature of the 
service by excluding a wide range of services by definition and by placing 
restrictions on the flow of client demand. 
Reference: Colebatch, H.K. 1972 on studying local services. (Paoer 
presented to East African Universities Social Science 
Conference, Nairobi). 
